fix(anti-hijack): validate cookie_id against DB on every authed read

Closes the post-recovery re-attack window. Previously cookies were
authenticated purely cryptographically — once a hijacker received a
signed cookie for student_id=X, that cookie remained valid forever
(until QUIZ_SECRET_KEY rotated), even after admin clear-student + legit
re-claim issued a fresh cookie_id for X.

Now /me, /event, and /ws/student all check that the cookie's cookie_id
matches participants.cookie_id for the (sid, student_id). Mismatch ->
401 + Set-Cookie clearing for HTTP, ws.close(4001) for WS. The legit
re-claim wins because admin clear_student deletes the row and the next
join inserts the new student's cookie_id; the hijacker's cookie now
fails the DB check on every subsequent request.

Test: tests/test_anti_cheat.py::test_post_recovery_old_cookie_is_dead
covers the full hijack -> clear -> re-claim -> hijacker-locked-out
sequence end to end.

app/room.py

@@ -189,6 +189,22 @@ class RoomManager:
             + sum(len(clients) for clients in self.projector_clients.values())
         )
 
+    async def cookie_id_matches(self, sid: str, student_id: str, cookie_id: str) -> bool:
+        """Check the student's signed cookie_id against the DB participant
+        row. Used to defend against the post-recovery re-attack: after
+        admin clears a hijacked id and the legitimate student re-joins
+        with a fresh cookie_id, the original hijacker's cookie is still
+        cryptographically valid (the secret key is unchanged), but the
+        DB cookie_id now belongs to the legit student. We reject any
+        request whose cookie_id doesn't match the current row."""
+        async with connect(self.settings.db_path) as db:
+            cur = await db.execute(
+                "SELECT cookie_id FROM participants WHERE sid = ? AND student_id = ?",
+                (sid, student_id),
+            )
+            row = await cur.fetchone()
+        return row is not None and row["cookie_id"] == cookie_id
+
     async def add_participant(self, sid: str, student_id: str, name: str, cookie_id: str) -> None:
         """First-claim-wins. Raises DuplicateStudentId if this student_id
         is already in the participants table for this sid (an attempt to

app/routes_student.py

@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ def router(settings: Settings, rooms: RoomManager) -> APIRouter:
         identity = auth.get_student_identity(settings, request, sid)
         if not identity:
             raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Student cookie required")
+        if not await rooms.cookie_id_matches(sid, identity["student_id"], identity["cookie_id"]):
+            # Same defence as /me: a stale post-recovery cookie should
+            # not be able to pollute the audit log.
+            raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Re-join required")
         await rooms.log_event(
             sid,
             student_id=identity["student_id"],
@@ -120,17 +124,18 @@ def router(settings: Settings, rooms: RoomManager) -> APIRouter:
         identity = auth.get_student_identity(settings, request, sid)
         if not identity:
             raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Student cookie required")
-        try:
+        # Validate cookie_id against DB. Two cases this catches:
-            return await rooms.me(sid, identity["student_id"])
+        #   (a) participant row is gone (session reset, admin clear, DB
-        except KeyError:
+        #       rebuild) → cookie_id_matches returns False → 401 + cleared.
-            # Cookie's student_id is no longer in the DB (e.g. session reset
+        #   (b) participant row exists but with a different cookie_id (a
-            # or DB rebuilt while the cookie persisted). Send 401 with the
+        #       prior hijacker's cookie still cryptographically valid
-            # cookie cleared so the client renders the join form. We build
+        #       after the legit student re-claimed via admin recovery)
-            # the JSONResponse directly because raising HTTPException would
+        #       → 401 + cleared. The hijacker's stale cookie is now dead.
-            # bypass the cookie mutation.
+        if not await rooms.cookie_id_matches(sid, identity["student_id"], identity["cookie_id"]):
             resp = JSONResponse({"detail": "Re-join required"}, status_code=401)
             resp.delete_cookie(auth.STUDENT_COOKIE, path="/")
             return resp
+        return await rooms.me(sid, identity["student_id"])
 
     @api.get("/api/session/{sid}/stats")
     async def stats(sid: str, request: Request, question_idx: int | None = None):
@@ -145,6 +150,12 @@ def router(settings: Settings, rooms: RoomManager) -> APIRouter:
         if not identity or not await rooms.session_exists(sid):
             await websocket.close(code=4001)
             return
+        # cookie_id-vs-DB check closes the post-recovery re-attack window:
+        # a hijacker's WS won't authenticate after the legit student has
+        # re-claimed their id via admin clear-student.
+        if not await rooms.cookie_id_matches(sid, identity["student_id"], identity["cookie_id"]):
+            await websocket.close(code=4001)
+            return
         await rooms.student_ws(websocket, sid, identity)
 
     # ---- Projector view (public, read-only) -------------------------------

tests/test_anti_cheat.py

@@ -74,6 +74,42 @@ def test_admin_clear_student_404s_when_no_match(client, sid):
     assert client.delete("/admin/api/students/nobody").status_code == 404
 
 
+def test_post_recovery_old_cookie_is_dead(client, sid):
+    """Hijack -> recovery flow: after admin clears a hijacked id and the
+    legitimate student re-claims with a fresh cookie_id, the original
+    hijacker's still-cryptographically-valid cookie must NOT continue to
+    authenticate. The DB cookie_id check is what closes that gap."""
+    Hijacker = client.__class__
+    hijacker = Hijacker(client.app)
+    response = hijacker.post(f"/api/session/{sid}/join", json={"student_id": "alice", "name": "Hijacker"})
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    # Hijacker's cookie/me works while they hold the slot.
+    assert hijacker.get(f"/api/session/{sid}/me").status_code == 200
+
+    # Admin clears the hijacked id; legit student re-claims with a fresh
+    # browser (= fresh cookie jar = fresh signed cookie_id).
+    admin_login(client)
+    assert client.delete(f"/admin/api/students/alice").status_code == 200
+    legit = Hijacker(client.app)
+    response = legit.post(f"/api/session/{sid}/join", json={"student_id": "alice", "name": "Real Alice"})
+    assert response.status_code == 200
+    assert legit.get(f"/api/session/{sid}/me").json()["name"] == "Real Alice"
+
+    # The hijacker's old (still-cryptographically-valid) cookie now fails
+    # auth because its cookie_id doesn't match the DB row anymore.
+    response = hijacker.get(f"/api/session/{sid}/me")
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+    # And the cookie should be cleared so their browser bounces back to
+    # the join form rather than retrying with the dead cookie.
+    assert any(
+        h.lower() == "set-cookie" and "qz_student" in v and ("max-age=0" in v.lower() or "expires=" in v.lower())
+        for h, v in response.headers.items()
+    ), response.headers
+    # Same goes for the audit-event endpoint.
+    response = hijacker.post(f"/api/session/{sid}/event", json={"kind": "blur"})
+    assert response.status_code == 401
+
+
 def test_submit_lockout_is_server_enforced(client, sid):
     """Server-side: a second submit for the same (sid, student_id, qidx)
     returns the *original* ack rather than overwriting the answer. The